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POLICING ILLICIT U.S. BUSINESS
ACTIONS OVERSEAS
JEFFREY P. BIALOS & GREGORY HUSISIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT: COPING WITH CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES. New York:
Oceana Publications Inc., 1996. xi + 170pp.
Reviewed by Paula Stern* and Alexander W. Koff**
In The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Coping with Corruption in
Transitional Economies, Jeffrey P. Bialos and Gregory Husisian explore a
wide range of problems involving international bribery and its
corresponding effects.' Its six chapters range from a legal discourse to a
policy discourse to an economic discourse regarding the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA).2 But this is basically a book intended for business
practitioners interested in avoiding FCPA liability, not lawyers or
policymakers, and its strength lies in the breadth of advice it provides
businesspersons. Although the authors' stations as practicing attorneys
knowledgeable with FCPA issues lend credence to the underlying text,
non-businesspersons may be frustrated with the lack of primary
supporting materials.
The examination of international bribery and its corresponding effects
are both timely and important. In May 1997, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) announced it formally
adopted a recommendation to help suppress bribery in international
business. This recommendation was the result of extended negotiations
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1. JEFFREY P. BiALOS & GREGORY HusIsIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTIcES AcT:
COPING wITH CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES (1996).
2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1994), as
amended.
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over a considerable period of time. In short, prohibition of foreign
payments is an area of potential intemational norm creation.
At the same time, the international business community is
experiencing a period of galloping globalization. In the wake of
communism's collapse, joint ventures, privatizations and other transitional
economy opportunities, the idea of foreign investment has taken the
business community by storm. Foreign investment is at a feverish pitch as
businesses attempt to harness burgeoning opportunities overseas. In
addition, U.S. fascination with emerging markets rife with corruption only
thrusts the FCPA further into the limelight.
With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. government is pushing an anti-
corruption agenda with its allies. Economic matters formerly given short
shrift when compared to strategic alliances and other national security
considerations are now being closely reexamined. A top priority of the
Clinton administration is clearly the creation of an economic playing field
where U.S. business concerns may operate in full parity with their foreign
competitors.
This reality raises a more subtle point acutely recognized by the
authors. The increase in U.S. government sponsored initiatives to export
the standards of the FCPA raises the possibility of foreign governments
enacting similar anti-bribery provisions. The extent to which the FCPA is
mirrored multiplies the audience interested in exploring the subject of this
book. In order to sidestep effectively the pitfalls of U.S. prosecution for
FCPA violations, businesses should understand its provisions.
When enacted twenty years ago, the FCPA had noticeable negative
effects on U.S. efforts to secure business opportunities abroad.
Understanding this, the authors examine whether the FCPA should be
amended, maintained or exported. Making clear their opinion that the
harmful effects of corruption outweigh the benefits, they opine that the
FCPA will not cause a competitive disadvantage for U.S. firms once there
are uniform anti-bribery laws.' This set of reviewers agrees that leveling
the playing field to uniformly prohibit bribery is better than repealing the
FCPA. It is better economically because it helps transitional economies
avoid the effects of dead-weight loss,4 it is better politically because it
helps fragile economies make the transition to a capitalistic form of
government and it is better morally because it helps companiesunderscore they are not willing to bribe.6
3. See BIALOS & HUSIsIAN, supra note 1, at 146.
4. See id. at 147.
5. See id. at 150-51.
6. See id. at 169.
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THE BOOK BY CHAPTER
Chapter one describes the nature of the problem addressed in the
book. In developing economies that are or once were communist, such as
China and Russia, there is often a blurring of the public and private sector.
This blurring is exacerbated by the lack of developed ethics rules. U.S.
firms face the dilemma of trying to remain competitive with foreign firms
while being constrained by the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. The
authors explain that although it is widely illegal for government officials
to accept bribes, the U.S. remains the only industrialized nation whose
laws forbid corrupt payments outside of its borders.
Chapters two and three provide truncated guidance for business
leaders interested in understanding the legal liabilities and defenses to the
FCPA. For example, the FCPA covers only payments to government
officials. It does not criminalize bribes made to private companies.
Although many parties are subject to the FCPA's provisions, inadvertent
violations are rare. A corrupt payment is a precursor to liability. It
connotes an evil motive or purpose, such as an attempt to induce an
official to misuse a government position in order to obtain or to retain
business. The FCPA also prohibits payments through intermediaries.
Chapters four and five discuss factors a company should take into
consideration when quantifying FCPA risks regarding transitional
economy investment. By doing so, it underscores the previous chapters,
which explain that a FCPA violation requires: (1) a corrupt payment made
by an agent or subsidiary; (2) an act in furtherance of that payment; (3)
knowledge by the company; and (4) ultimately prosecution by relevant
authorities. The chapters also discuss issues such as how to structure
relationships with foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures, recordkeeping
requirements for minority-owned foreign ventures, disclosure
requirements when a FCPA violation is discovered, and what measures to
take when dealing with distributors, officials of state-owned enterprises,
sales agents or intermediaries.
Chapter six considers what additional steps, if any, the U.S.
government should undertake to level the playing field for U.S. firms. The
measures range from amerding the FCPA to reducing demand for bribes
and company incentives to bribe. In this set of reviewers' opinions,
increasing pay will increase inequities in income existing between
government and private sector workers in many countries without
changing the marginal incentives to bribe; this is where strengthened
enforcement plays a role.'
7. See id at 75.
8. See id at 133 n.6.
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A supply-side option advocated in the book is currently being
implemented. As mentioned earlier, in May 1997, the OECD announced it
formally adopted a recommendation to help suppress bribery in
international business. The final recommendation commits OECD
members to submit to legislative bodies proposals criminalizing bribery
by April 1, 1998, and to seek enactment of those proposals by the end of
1998.9
EVALUATION
The great strength of this book lies in the breadth of advice it provides
businesspersons interested in mitigating FCPA risks. It discusses what
factors to consider before entering transitional economies and suggests
ways to avert FCPA violations. But it is important to remember the book
is intended for those in business, not law. While lawyers may be apt to
examine hypotheticals and case-by-case scenarios, businesses often place
a premium on definite solutions and advice. Those readers who wish to
avoid sifting through the entire book to glean advice relevant to their
situation should focus on the latter pages of chapter five.'0 These pages
provide concise and well-documented advice regarding a company's
duties to detect and disclose FCPA violations.
When a business discovers information indicating that corrupt
payments are being made, the business must investigate. An internal
inquiry should be undertaken when it appears senior management is
involved, the conduct is likely to recur, the payment is large, the business
is significant or it appears the payment could take place only with the
complicity of multiple members of the business or its foreign subsidiary."
The authors helpfully note that outside counsel lend the appearance of
impartiality and their reports are protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Upon discovering a bribe, the authors note a business faces difficult
choices. Thankfully, they offer substantive suggestions of concrete actions
that should be taken to divorce the business from an illicit payment. At a
minimum some form of action should be taken, such as taking action
9. See Revised Recommendations of the Council on Combating Bribery in International
Business Transactions, OECD Doc. C(97)123/FINAL (May 30, 1997) (adopted by the Council
at its 901st session on May 23, 1997). See also OECD News Release, OECD Countries to
Reinforce Measures to Combat Bribery, May 26, 1997 (visited Sept. 24, 1997)
<http://www.oecd.org/news-andevents/release/nw97-44a.htm>; OECD News Release,
Statement by Mr Donald J. Johnston, Secretary-General of the OECD, to Open the Conference
on Bribery in International Business Transactions, Nov. 6, 1996 (visited Sept. 24, 1997)
<http://www.oecd.org/news-and._events/releasenw96 I 00a.htm>.
10. See BIALos & HUsIsIAN, supra note 1, at 121-30.
11. See id. at 124.
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against the offending employee or agent, ceasing all payments to that
entity, promulgating strengthened ethical guidelines, requiring
affirmations to comply with FCPA guidelines, or even canceling the
illicitly obtained project."
Regarding disclosure, the authors suggest the FCPA does not require
disclosure of detected violations of U.S. law. However, a publicly reported
company may wish to make disclosures because of Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) rules. 3 Although the authors counsel that
basic prudence and sensible corporate decisionmaking favors disclosure in
most FCPA cases, they do recognize this decision is necessarily case-
specific. Fortunately, to help in deciding whether to disclose a known
violation, the authors suggest considering such factors as the probability
that the violation will surface, the probable criminal or civil penalties, the
effect of adverse publicity, the risks of forcing a broader government
investigation and the likelihood that timely, voluntary reporting will lead
to mitigation of sanctions. 4
In other areas of the book, however, the authors' touch is less sure.
The authors rely heavily upon secondary sources for support, and some
citations are either incomplete or do not support the accompanying text.
For example, the authors write, "A report prepared for President Yeltsin
'concluded that 70 to 80 percent of all banks and private enterprises have
been victims of extortion."' The citation reads, "See Statement of Sen.
Mitch McConnell (D-KY)."'5 Because the authors did not cite directly to
the report, it appears they are relying upon the Senator's statement without
checking the underlying information. If so, the statistics the authors used
in the text are questionable. This citation is also incomplete, and it is
impossible for an interested reader to cross-check the statement. Finally,
Senator McConnell is actually a Republican!
This set of reviewers also has reservations about relying upon the
formulaic probabilities the authors devise in Figures B and C. 6 Both
figures attempt to quantify the cumulative probability that a U.S. business
will be held liable for a FCPA violation. In these figures, the authors
evaluate the risks of (1) a corrupt payment occurring, (2) the business
taking an "act in furtherance" (3) while having the requisite "knowledge"
and (4) the violation being prosecuted by U.S. authorities. Figure B
12. See id. at 126.
13. Even if a payment was not material to the financial statements, it nevertheless could
expose the company to a material contingent liability that arguably should be exposed on the
company's financial statements.
14. See BIALOS & HUSISIAN, supra note 1, at 129-30.
15. Id. at 19 n.55.
16. See id. at 82-83.
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Michigan Journal of International Law
estimates FCPA risks without risk mitigation, and Figure C includes
mitigation.
Figure B estimates the risks to be 80% x 60% x 60% x 80%, finding a
23% cumulative probability of liability. Figure C estimates the risks to be
25% x 30% x 30% x 20%, finding a 0.45% cumulative probability of
liability. Although decision-trees are helpful, additional work must be
done to substantiate the above percentages to make the cumulative
probabilities cited above meaningful. Why is there an 80% chance of a
corrupt payment occurring? Even assuming the correct figure is 80%, why
does risk mitigation drop this to 25%? The authors recognize that this
approach has limitations, including that it does not incorporate a particular
company's attitude toward risk, but it is important to clarify that the final
quantitative percentages are pure estimates and are not based on data.
THOUGHTS ON CORRUPTION: SECTION 301 AND THE WTO
The authors merely touch upon an interesting idea regarding the use
of the U.S. trade remedy Section 301' 7 and the World Trade Organization
(WTO)' 8 to address foreign bribery. With passage of the OECD final
recommendation calling for an end to toleration of foreign bribery, the eye
of the international community is clearly focused on this issue. The
authors argue that should foreign governments tolerate corrupt payments,
a pattern of such toleration may be actionable under Section 301. Section
301 provides that the president shall take action against "an act, policy, or
practice of a foreign country ... [that] is unjustifiable and burdens or
restricts United States commerce. 19 The authors opine that a foreign
government failing to take adequate action to prevent private conduct that
ultimately harms U.S. interests may have engaged in a state "act."20 As the
authors acknowledge, this is a novel and untested approach.
The authors also argue that illicit payments may be in contravention
of WTO obligations. But if this is actionable before the WTO as the
authors suggest, it is still debatable whether the U.S. must first utilize the
WTO's dispute settlement mechanism before imposing unilateral
sanctions pursuant to Section 301.2 At least one government has argued
17. See id. at 120-2 1.
18. See id. at 159-62.
19. 19 U.S.C.A. § 241 1(a)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1997).
20. BIALOS & HUSiSIAN, supra note 1, at 121.
21. See A. Lynne Puckett and William L. Reynolds, Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement
Under Section 301: At Odds with the WTO?, 90 Am. J. Int'l L. 675 (1996) (stating that the
USTR may be increasingly reluctant to pursue unilateral sanctions under Section 301 and more
likely to defer to WTO dispute settlement to strengthen the multilateral system).
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that resort to Section 301 unilateral sanctions would be inconsistent with
WTO Member obligations."
The Final Act establishing the WTO creates a single institutional
framework encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), as modified by the Uruguay Round. Basically, the Final Act
contains legal texts defining WTO Member obligations, establishing
dispute settlement procedures, encouraging greater transparency in
national trade policymaking, and specifying plurilateral trade agreements,
which are agreements managed by the WTO but not covered by the
Uruguay Round.
WTO Members must accept all the results of the Uruguay Round
without exception. The Government Procurement Agreement" is a
plurilateral trade agreement and is therefore not covered by the Uruguay
Round. Members choose whether to be bound by its provisions.
Although the authors do not discuss specific provisions in great detail,
they argue the Government Procurement Agreement may restrict illicit
foreign payments." Article XIII(4) of the Government Procurement
Agreement governs the award of contracts. In addition, Article VII
governs tendering procedures. Whether a foreign bribe violates these
provisions is left as a matter for further research.
As the authors note, GATT Article XI may also prohibit bribery."
Although the authors again do not discuss the issue in detail, this set of
reviewers notices an interesting question. If Article XI does prohibit illicit
foreign payments, would it do so through a violation or a non-violation
complaint?
In a violation complaint, Members allege that a measure of another
WTO Member is inconsistent with its WTO obligations. Violation
22. See United States-Imposition of Import Duties on Automobiles From Japan Under
Sections 301 and 304 of the Trade Act of 1974, Request for Consultations by Japan, WTO Doc.
WT/056/1 (May 22, 1995) (Japanese allegations that the United States' proposed import
surcharges violated GAT Articles I and II. Status reports on WTO disputes may be found on
the Internet at <http:llwww.wto.orglwto/disputelbulletinlhtm>).
23. The GATT Government Procurement Agreement (1996 Code), as renegotiated at
Marrakesh, updates and improves the 1979 Tokyo Round Government Procurement Agreement.
See Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, Texts of Agreements, Implementing Bill, Statement of
Administrative Action, and Required Supporting Statements, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., H. Doc. No.
103-316, at 1719 (1994). See also id. at 1037 for a discussion of the Code's provisions.
24. See BIALOs & HUsisIAN, supra note 1, at 160.
25. See id.
26. For an excellent guide to the text of the GAT see WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
GUIDE TO GAIT LAW AND PRACTICE (1995). "GAT 1994;' as defined in Annex 1A of the
WTO Agreement, includes the original text of the GATT (GATT 1947), legal acquis of the
GAT up to 1994, the understandings negotiated at the Uruguay Round and the Marrakesh
protocol. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1140, 1154 (1994).
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complaints are not concerned with whether the application of the law is
proper, but whether the domestic law itself violates WTO Member obli-
gations. In non-violation complaints, Members allege that any benefit
accruing to it directly or indirectly is being "nullified or impaired" by
application of the law, not that the underlying law itself conflicts with
WTO obligations."
In WTO violation complaints, the panel or appellate body makes a
recommendation that the violating Member bring the measure into con-
formity with the WTO agreements. In WTO non-violation complaints, the
panel and appellate body recommendations are limited. Where a panel has
found that a measure of a Member nullifies or impairs benefits but does
not conflict with the provisions of a covered agreement (a non-violation
case), a panel must only recommend that the parties reach a "mutually
satisfactory adjustment." In such cases, there is no obligation to change
the WTO consistent measure but the party nullifying and impairing
benefits must cease the infringing activity. A country may bring both a
violation and a non-violation case, such as the U.S. has done in the Fuji
film dispute with Japan.'
GATr Article XI provides for a general elimination of quantitative
restrictions. All WTO Members are bound by its provisions. Article XI: 1
reads, in pertinent part, "[n]o prohibitions or restrictions .... whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other meas-
ures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product ... ." Although the authors have not exam-
ined this issue, the following presents some introductory research into an
area that requires additional attention.
The 1988 Report of the Panel on "Japan-Trade in Semi-Conductors"
determined non-mandatory government requests constituted measures in
contravention of Article XI. The panel determined that (1) there were
reasonable grounds to believe sufficient incentives existed for non-
mandatory measures to take effect and that (2) the operation of the
measures was dependent on government action. Because the difference
between the measures and mandatory requirements was only one of form
and not of substance, the Japanese government's action was inconsistent
with Article XI? Similarly, perhaps incentives to bribe government
27. GAI 1994 art. XXIII.
28. See Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, Request for
the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS44 (Sept. 23, 1996).
Recent WTO documents are also available on the Internet at <http://www.wto.org>.
29. GAIT 1994 art. XI (emphasis added).
30. See Japan-Trade in Semi-Conductors, Report of the Panel, paras. 104-109, at 38-40,
GATT Doc. L/6309 (Mar. 24,1988).
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officials could likewise be in contravention of Article XI. Of course, this
assumes the bribery prohibits the importation of a product.
Perhaps a non-violation case also may be made regarding bribery. The
1984 Report of the "Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather"
found restrictions on leather imports constituted a prima facie case of
nullification or impairment. According to GATT practice, Japan had the
burden of rebutting the presumption that nullification or impairment had
actually occurred. The panel presumed nullification or impairment
because of the volume of trade affected, the increased transaction costs
and the uncertainties created regarding investment plans." Similarly,
bribery often involves contracts worth millions of dollars, undoubtedly
increases transaction costs and creates investment uncertainties.
Whether the WTO is a proper forum for dealing with illicit payments
is an area for further scholarly work. However, if members do request
dispute settlement consultations for a violation or a non-violation case,
such disputes would be settled relatively quickly under the WT'O's adju-
dicative dispute settlement process.
CONCLUSION
Foreign bribery has generated a great deal of attention in the last
twenty years. The trend seems to indicate that governments are outlawing
such activities. In addition, perhaps international forums such as the WTO
may be used in the future to address the problems posed by illicit
payments. As an examination of the underlying principles of the law of
the FCPA and its provisions, we hope this book will be only the first
among more to come addressing this important topic.
31. See Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, Report of the Panel, paras. 47-
48,53, 55, at 15-16, GAIT Doc. L/5623 (Mar. 2, 1984).
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